UNDER CONSTRUCTION

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Te CIA intelligence reports, produced by the Directorate of Operations (DO)3 made a signifcant contribution to understanding the history, plans and intentions of the Soviet Navy. Many of these documents are being released for the first time. These intelligence reports, however, do not repre- sent the complete record—much information essential in the estimative process was from émigrés and defectors, as well as from the U.S. Navy, and imagery and signals intelligence, which are not specifcally highlighted in this collection. In accordance with the National Security Council Intelligence Directive4 from 1955 to 1961, the military services’ intelligence components were the principal contributors to the military- focused NIEs. Te CIA, however, did make contributions on military-related economic and scientifc subjects. Te released fnished products do not specifcally address the contribu- tions of political, weapons, and scientifc intelligence eforts or economic analyses, including armaments production and naval shipbuilding; however they do address, as appropriate, the operational and strategic consequences of these eforts. A command structure for a combined Warsaw Pact Navy existed, but the real Warsaw Pact Navy was the Soviet Navy from the signing of the Warsaw Pact Treaty in 1955 to the fall of the USSR in 1991, therefore the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact “navies” are not specifcally addressed. An IC assessment of the Warsaw Pact “navies” appeared in NIE 11-3-55, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action through 1960 and it states, “Owing to their small size, their meager equipment, and the unreliability of personnel, the satellite navies provide only a minor contribution to Soviet naval strength.” Te collection also includes many NIEs and fnished intel- ligence products prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence (DI)5, some of which have been previously released. Te DI reports were the detailed basis of CIA’s contributions to the NIEs focused on the Soviet Navy and its comple- mentary role in a Warsaw Pact confict with NATO. Tose reports also provided the background for subsequent current intelligence. Included with this essay is a catalog with summaries of the newly released documents for each chapter and an appendix of documents previously released. All the documents are available on the CIA’s website at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/historical-collections. Some of the historical background information is taken or quoted from Robert W. Herrick’s book, Soviet Naval Strategy, frst printed in 1967 and John B. Hattendorf ’s, Te Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986. A secret version was published in 1989; an unclassifed version was published in 2004 in the Naval War College Newport Papers, No. 19. 3 Te acronym, DO, Directorate of Operations, used interchangeably throughout the paper the role of CIA to economic and scientifc analysis, making the military services responsible for with the acronyms used in the earlier years: Directorate of Plans, 1950 to 1973, or National all military intelligence. Te 1958 revised version broadened the areas for which the CIA could Clandestine Service (NCS), 2005 to 2015. produce intelligence. 4 See NSCID No. 3, Coordination of Intelligence Production, 13 January 1948 and NSCID No. 3, 5 Te Directorate of Intelligence, renamed Directorate of Analysis in 2015, houses the Agency’s Coordination of Intelligence Production, 21 April 1958 for details of the responsibilities of the CIA analytic cadre, and is responsible for the production of fnished intelligence. Tis essay uses the and other intelligence departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. NSCID No. 1 limited DI terminology, as consistent with the nomenclature of the time frame.

A Note about What You Are Reading

CLANDESTINE SOURCE REPORTING Intelligence reporting derived from human and techni- cal collection provide intelligence information that may contribute to or form the basis of such analysis—“raw” intelligence reports support “fnished” intelligence products. During this period, the DO used the titles “Information Report,” “Intelligence Information Report,” and “Intelligence Information Special Report” for disseminated clandestine intelligence reports. DIRECTOR ATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DI) ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTS Te DI produces all-source fnished intelligence (analysis) on topics of interest to the President, members of Congress, Cabinet members and the military services. All-source products are based on all relevant photo- graphic, signals intelligence, clandestine and open source information. “Finished intelligence” has gone through the proper coordination within the ofce of origin, with other appropriate DI and/or DO ofces; and has been reviewed by the appropriate managers including the DDI (Deputy Director for Intelligence). NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (NIE) A NIE is the highest form of fnished national intelligence. It is intended to refect the consensus of the Intelligence Community regarding some issue of major importance to national security, and it attempts to forecast the future development of present military, political, or econom- ic situations in order to identify the implications for national policymakers. Most NIEs relate to issues of continuing concern, for example, Warsaw Pact naval forces opposite NATO, and are produced or updated annually or biannually, or on some other regular sched- ule. A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) is produced when some unforeseen development, for example, the Berlin crisis, requires an immediate ad hoc collection of the situation. An Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM) does the same thing as a NIE only on a more narrow issue of interest to a smaller audience.

CHAPTER I

Stalin's Navy and the Early Khrushchev Period

Under Stalin’s direction, the Soviet Navy underwent a dramatic expansion after World War II, frst in the Cruiser-destroyer force and later in submarines, becoming by many measures the second largest Navy in the world by 1957. Te Stalin-era navy generally refected the Soviet World War II experience but did not refect the impact of nuclear weapons nor did it represent any real expeditionary capability—the Soviet Navy was seldom seen outside of home waters. When Stalin died the Navy lost its patron. After Khrushchev became First Secretary of the party in 1955, he decisively altered Stalin’s naval policy and the direction of military policy and doctrine in general. His vision for the navy was not without precedent. In the earliest days of the Communist state until the early 1930s, the navy and naval thinking was dominated by ex-Tsarist ofcers, the “old school” theorists, who advocated the development of a high-seas f leet analogous in composition and intent to the f leets of other naval powers. Tose naval ofcers were purged or sidelined by a new crop of ofcers brought up through the ranks under Lenin and Stalin. Tese were the “new school” theorists, who advocated limiting the navy to a coastal defense role with only modest forces of aviation and coastal patrol craft. Khrushchev’s vision bore all the earmarks of the “new school” naval theories, but in the context of the nuclear age. As a result, new construction of major surface vessels for the Navy was very nearly terminated. Four or more cruisers were left unfnished in their shipyards and other projects were curtailed. At the same time Khrushchev shifted resources to the construction of new classes of submarines including conventionally-powered and nuclear-powered, missile-armed and torpedo-attack. He also shifted naval aviation emphasis to long-range attack and anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and abolished Naval Fighter Aviation. Analysis in 1963 describes the changes in naval forces, strategy and doctrine during the period 1950–1959 based on open source documents and Soviet classifed documents clandestinely passed to CIA from 1961 to 1962.6 Developments in nuclear and conventional weapons ofered Khrushchev an opportunity to dramatically reduce overall military expenditures and reallocate military manpower quotas to civilian industry. Tis is refected when Khrushchev announced a reduction of 640,000 men from the Soviet armed forces in August of 1955. In May 1956 he called for another cutback of 1.2 million men. Khrushchev later announced two additional unilateral troop reductions: one of 300,000 in January 1958 and another of 1.2 million in a January 1960 speech to the Supreme Soviet. All of the proposed reductions were meant to serve several purposes: to shift funds to the production of missiles and long-range bombers; to lessen the burden of military force requirements on heavy industry; to free labor for productive purposes in the civilian economy; and to bring international pressure on the United States to reduce its forces.